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Abstract 
The first part of this paper examines the theoretical and empirical case for full 
capital account liberalisation in developing countries(DCs) and finds it 
unconvincing. Indeed, analysis and evidence presented here point to a 
compelling case against it. The second part considers the liberalisation of only 
the long-term capital account, particularly FDI - a form of in-flow favoured by 
most economists. This paper, however, argues that even FDI, if unregulated, 
may do more harm than good. It is suggested that DCs should, therefore, resist 
the new advanced country proposals for a multilateral agreement on FDI. 
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Capital Account Liberalisation, Free Long-Term Capital Flows, Financial 
Crises and Economic Development 
 
 
1. Introduction:  Main issues and the international policy context  
 
In examining the relationship between financial liberalisation, crises and long-
term economic development, one of the most controversial issues is that of 
capital account liberalisation. This is largely because it is the area where there is 
the greatest disconnection between economic theory and actual events in the 
real world. Neoclassical theory suggests that the flows of external capital should 
be equilibrating and help smooth a country's consumption or production paths.  
However, in the real world, exactly the opposite appears to happen.  Capital 
account liberalisation has been associated with serious economic and financial 
crises in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s. The proponents of neo-classical 
theory argue that the case for free capital flows is no different from that for free 
trade - the former could simply be regarded as a form of inter-temporal trade.  
The first part of the paper (sections II-IV) will address this central controversy 
in relation to developing countries and specifically ask the following questions: 
 
 Are trade liberalisation and free capital flows analogous in increasing social 
welfare? What are the conditions necessary to maximise their prospective 
benefits? 
 What is the precise nature of the relationship between capital account 
liberalisation and economic crises? 
 Why do such crises occur far more in developing than in advanced 
countries? 
 Do free capital flows lead to faster long term economic growth which may 
compensate for the crisis and the economic instability associated with capital 
account liberalisation? 
 
In analysing capital account liberalisation it is customary to distinguish between 
short-term (e.g., portfolio flows and short-term bank loans) and long-term 
capital flows (e.g. FDI). In the light of the recent deep economic and financial 
crises in Asia, Latin America and Russia many (but by no means all) 
economists will today accept that free short-term capital flows could have 
seriously adverse consequences for developing countries, as these flows are 
often volatile subject to surges and sudden withdrawals. However, long-term 
capital flows, particularly FDI, are regarded as much more stable and therefore 
for this and other reasons are thought to have a positive influence on long-term  
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economic development. It is therefore suggested that developing countries, in 
liberalising their capital account, may wish in the short- to medium-term to 
liberalise only long-term capital flows such as FDI, while still controlling, 
partially or wholly, short-term flows.  
 
Even Joseph Stiglitz who has been a fierce critic of precipitate capital account 
liberalisation in developing countries appears to favour free FDI flows. Thus 
Stiglitz (2000) finds striking "the zeal with which the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) had requested an extension of its mandate to include capital market 
liberalisation a short two years earlier at the Annual Meetings in Hong Kong. It 
should have been clear then, and it is certainly clear now, that the position was 
maintained either as a matter of ideology or of special interests, and not on the 
basis of careful analysis of theory, historical experience or a wealth of 
econometric studies. Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that there is not 
only no case for capital market liberalisation, but that there is a fairly 
compelling case against full liberalisation" (page 1076).  Stiglitz, however, 
makes it clear that his general strictures against capital account liberalisation are 
primarily directed against short-term speculative flows. He writes, "the 
argument for foreign direct investment, for instance, is compelling. Such 
investment brings with it not only resources, but technology, access to markets, 
and (hopefully) valuable training, an improvement in human capital. Foreign 
direct investment is also not as volatile - and therefore as disruptive - as the 
short-term flows that can rush into a country and, just as precipitously, rush 
out".(page 1076). 
 
This paper will take major issue, with the orthodox laissez faire position (see for 
example Summers, 2000; Fischer, 2000), of the desirability of speedy capital 
account liberalisation in developing countries. It will however also part 
company with Stiglitz in important respects. It will be argued here that although 
Stiglitz is right in suggesting that free-trade in capital is not the same thing as 
free trade in goods, he implicitly assigns too much virtue to the latter. This 
argument will be made here more in global economic terms rather than in those 
of the traditional concepts, such as infant industry protection. It will further be 
suggested that not only do developing countries need controls against short-term 
capital flows for many of the reasons Stiglitz puts forward, but they also require 
controls against free FDI flows. The second part (Section V-VIII of the paper) 
would argue that free movements of FDI would contribute to financial fragility 
in developing economies and also will not serve the cause of economic 
development in a number of other ways. 
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These issues of capital account liberalisation are of course not only of academic 
interest, but clearly of serious policy concern for developing countries.  There is 
however, also an important international context to the policy debate on this 
subject. The goal of capital account liberalisation for all countries, together with 
an orderly and fast progress towards it, has been at the heart of the proposals by 
G7 countries for the New International Financial Architecture (NIFA). 
Similarly, the European Union and Japan have raised the question of the free 
movements of FDI as an important subject for study and eventual negotiations 
at the WTO. There is already a large literature on the NIFA
1, while the 
advanced countries proposal for the free movement of FDI has not received as 
much attention. This paper will attempt to redress this imbalance by focusing 
the second half of the paper on FDI flows, specifically on the proposed new 
multilateral agreement on such flows. 
 
2. Free trade versus free capital movements: Are they analogous
2? 
 
II.1  Free Trade and Trade Openness:  Analytical Considerations 
 
The case for free trade is best put in terms of the two fundamental theorems of 
welfare economics. According to the first welfare theorem, a competitive 
equilibrium in the absence of externalities and non-satiation constitutes a Pareto 
optimum.  The second theorem, which is more relevant for our purposes, states 
that any Pareto optimum can be realised as a competitive equilibrium in the 
presence of all-around convexity, provided suitable lump-sum transfers can be 
arranged among the participants.  These are demanding assumptions and are not 
easily met in the real world. Nevertheless, neo-classical economists suggest that 
such considerations do not destroy the case for trade openness but only change 
the nature of the argument. Thus Krugman (1987) concludes his classic defence 
of free trade in terms of modern theory as follows: "this is not the argument that 
free trade is optimal because markets are efficient. Instead it is a sadder but 
wiser argument for free trade as a rule of thumb in a world whose polities are as 
imperfect as its markets."   
 
As suggested in Chakravarty and Singh (1988), there is, however, a more robust 
economic case for trade openness (rather than free trade) which would explicitly 
take into account increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. It would 
also stress the role of learning through economic interactions with the rest of the 
world.  However, it would need to assume that the level of aggregate demand in 
the world and national economies was adequate to provide continuous full 
utilisation of resources and full employment. Within this kind of setting, trade  
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openness can be a source of great advantage for an economy for any one of the 
following reasons:   
 
(a) it may enable a country to concentrate its relatively specialised resources in 
areas of production where the world demand is highly income and price elastic; 
(b)  it may lead to diffusion of knowledge of a nature which can lead to 
considerable upgradation of the quality of local factors of production; 
(c) it may lead to sufficient competitive pressure to eliminate X-inefficiency; 
(d) trade may lead to changes in the distribution of income which can lead to a 
greater share of accumulation in national income; 
(e) trade may facilitate what Schumpeter stressed so much: an accelerated 
process of creative destruction. 
 
In general, trade openness works positively if the phenomenon of "learning" 
from contacts with the rest of the world are institutionalised through suitable 
adaptations on the policy side involving appropriate government interventions 
which make the domestic economy more responsive to change.  This is a main 
lesson that emerges from the outstanding industrial success of East Asian 
economies during the second half of the 20
th century.
3Countries such as Japan 
and Korea established comprehensive technology and industrial policies to 
institutionalise such learning. At a theoretical level, however, it must be stressed 
that learning over time is a more relevant paradigm for developmental gains 
from trade than the neoclassical story that emphasises the exploitation of 
arbitrage opportunities.  [See Passinetti (1981) for a fuller discussion of the 
learning approach to this issue.]     
 
To sum up, while the classical and neoclassical arguments for "free trade" suffer 
from serious conceptual and operational difficulties, there are indeed 
substantive benefits from "trade openness", which are more robust than the 
traditional neoclassical theory suggests.  However, such benefits can be realised 
only in a world of full employment coupled with an appropriate set of domestic 
policies which go considerably beyond the limits of commercial policy as 
traditionally defined.   
 
II.2  The Case for Capital Account Liberalisation 
 
The case for capital account liberalisation was authoritatively put forward by 
Stanley Fischer, the former Deputy Managing Director of the International 
Monetary Fund, in the following terms:   
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 that the benefits of liberalising the capital account outweigh the 
potential costs; 
 that countries need to prepare well for capital account liberalisation:  
economic policies and institutions, particularly the financial system, need 
to be adapted to operate in a world of liberalised capital markets; and 
 that an amendment of the IMF's Articles of Agreement is the best way 
of ensuring that capital account liberalisation is carried out in an orderly, 
non-disruptive way, that minimizes the risks that premature liberalisation 
could pose for an economy and its policymakers.  (Fischer (1997)) 
 
The background to Fischer's statement was a proposal by the IMF Interim 
Committee at the 52
nd Annual Meeting of the IMF and the World Bank in Hong 
Kong in April, 1997 at which the Committee proposed an amendment to the 
Fund's Articles of Agreement to extend the Fund's jurisdiction to capital 
movements. This amendment would make the liberalisation of international 
capital movements a central purpose of the Fund.  As Fischer puts it:  "In a 
nutshell, the prime goal of the amendments would be to enable the Fund to 
promote the orderly liberalisation of capital movements."  (Fischer (1997), 
p.12.  Emphasis in the original).   
 
It will be appreciated that under the original IMF Agreements the Fund was 
mandated to promote only current account liberalisation.  It had no jurisdiction 
over a country's capital account except "the right to require countries to impose 
capital controls in certain contexts." However, as Fischer admits:  "De facto, the 
Fund has become increasingly involved in helping member countries liberalise 
in a manner that does not undermine economic and financial stability." 
 
Fischer suggests that, at a theoretical level, capital account liberalisation would 
lead to global economic efficiency, allocation of world savings to those who are 
able to use them most productively, and would thereby increase social welfare.  
Citizens of countries with free capital movements would be able to diversify 
their portfolios and thereby increase their risk-adjusted rates of return. It would 
enable corporations in these countries to raise capital in international markets at 
a lower cost. It is suggested, moreover, that such liberalisation leads to further 
development of a country's financial system which in turn is thought to enhance 
productivity in the real economy by facilitating transactions and by better 
allocation of resources. Some argue that free capital movements will help 
increase world welfare through another channel, namely transferring resources 
from ageing populations and lower rates of return in advanced countries to 
younger populations and higher rates of return in newly industrialising  
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economies.  Such resource transfers will be Pareto optimal as both rich and poor 
countries would gain. 
 
Summers (2000) succinctly sums up the core point of the orthodox perspective 
as follows:  "… the abstract argument for a competitive financial system 
parallels the argument for competitive markets in general … Just as trade in 
goods across jurisdictions has benefits, so too will intertemporal trade and trade 
that shares risks across jurisdictions have benefits." 
 
Orthodox economists recognise that there are risks attached to capital account 
liberalisation.  Markets sometimes overreact or react late or react too fast.   
However, as Fischer notes "While I believe we sometimes see examples of 
market overreactions and unjustified contagion effects, I also believe that capital 
movements are mostly appropriate:  currency crises do not blow up out of a 
clear blue sky, but rather start as rational reactions to policy mistakes or external 
shocks. The problem is that once started, they may sometimes go too far."   
(Fischer (1997) pp 4-5)  In general, Fisher believes that capital markets serve as 
an important discipline on government macro-economic and other policies 
"which improves overall economic performance by rewarding good policies and 
penalising bad." (Fischer (1997), p 4) 
 
It will be useful to consider these arguments for capital account liberalisation 
initially at a relatively abstract level in the rest of this section and then in 
relation to empirical evidence in the following sections. The first important 
point to note is that, as in the case of the neo-classical argument for free trade, 
the maintenance of full employment and macro-economic stability constitute an 
important prerequisite for reaping the benefits of a globalised capital market.  
Specifically, as Rakshit (2001) suggests, the theoretical model of the beneficial 
effects of free capital movements makes the following assumptions: 
 
1)  resources are fully employed everywhere; 
2) capital flows themselves do not stand in the way of attaining full 
employment or macroeconomic stability; and 
3) the transfer of capital from one country to another is governed by long-
term returns on investment in different countries. 
 
The question whether these assumptions are likely to be valid under the current 
global economic regime is examined below.  
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II.3 The Case Against Free Capital Flows 
 
The theoretical case against the view that unfettered capital movements are 
essential for maximising the gains from trade and world economic welfare has 
been made by a number of economists from different schools of thought.  First 
within the neoclassical tradition itself, Stiglitz (2000) argues that the concept of 
free movements of capital is fundamentally different from that of free trade in 
goods. Capital flows are subject to asymmetric information, agency problems, 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  Although such problems may occur also in 
trade in goods and services, they are intrinsic to financial flows and are far more 
important.   
 
Importantly, there are also diverging views about the price formation process in 
asset markets such as the stock market and the currency markets. Orthodox 
economists subscribe to the theory of efficient markets.  In this view, prices are 
a collective outcome of actions of a multitude of individual economic agents 
whose behaviour is assumed to be based on utility maximisation and rational 
expectations. This price formation process is thought to lead to efficient prices 
in these markets. A powerful counter-view is that put forward by John Maynard 
Keynes (1936) in chapter 12 of the General Theory and which is encapsulated in 
his well known "beauty contest" analogy which highlights the role of 
speculation in determining prices.  
  
Thus, in Keynesian analysis, which has been formalised in recent theoretical 
contributions, price formation in asset markets may often be dominated by 
speculators or noise traders in modern parlance.  Moreover, theoretical work on 
Darwinian selection mechanisms indicate that the Friedman (1953) assertion 




Further the critical school emphasises that financial markets are particularly 
prone to co-ordination failures and often generate multiple equilibria, some 
good, some bad.  In the absence of appropriate coordination by the government 
or international authorities, an economy may languish in a low level 
equilibrium, producing sub-optimal output and employment levels.  
 
The post-Keynesian economists (see for example Davidson, 2001), take a more 
radical stance. They put forward analyses and evidence in favour of Keynes' 
thesis 'that flexible exchange rates and free international capital mobility are 
incompatible with global full employment and rapid economic growth in an era 
of multilateral free trade'. These economists also challenge the orthodox  
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presumption that transparency and availability of more information would make 
the financial markets less prone to crisis. They point out that the crises are 
fundamentally due to the fact that the future is uncertain and people have 
different perceptions about it. 
 
Keynes was very sceptical about the ability of the world economy under free 
trade and free capital movements to maintain balance of payments equilibrium 
between countries at full employment levels of output. In a famous passage he 
observed, "… the problem of maintaining equilibrium in the balance of 
payments between countries has never been solved … the failure to solve the 
problem has been a major cause of impoverishment and social discontent and 
even of wars and revolutions …  to suppose that there exists some smoothly 
functioning automatic mechanism of adjustment which preserves equilibrium 
only if we trust to matters of laissez faire is a doctrinaire delusion which 
disregards the lessons of historical experience without having behind it the 
support of sound theory"(Moggridge, 1980:21-22). Consequently the Keynesian 
design for the post-war international financial system did not envisage free 
capital movements. As Felix (1998) notes,  'Reflecting views then dominant 
among Anglo-Saxon economists, the Bretton Woods Accords were devised 
around the basic thesis that free international capital mobility is incompatible 
with the preservation of reasonably free trade and full employment.' 
 
Thus, the orthodox theory that financial liberalisation leads to global economic 
efficiency based on the analogy with free trade is flawed on several counts. 
Within the neoclassical tradition itself, it is the intrinsic nature of financial 
contracts which differentiates a market for the latter from that of ordinary goods 
in international trade: financial instruments are characterised by assymetric 
information between borrowers and lenders and since such transactions take 
place over time they are also subject to time inconsistency problems. These in 
turn generate moral hazard, leading to contagion and multiple equilibria which 
can produce pathological outcomes. The Keynesian and the post-Keynesian 
emphasis is on inherent uncertainty about the future, on speculation and the 
macro-economic co-ordination failures at both the national and international 





3. Empirical Research on Financial Liberalisation and Economic Crisis 
 
III.1  Banking and Currency Crises and the Real Economy 
 
The theoretical expectation of free capital movements leading to smoother 
income and consumption trajectories for individuals and countries following 
economic shocks than would otherwise be the case, has been confounded by the 
experience of developing countries. There now exists substantial empirical 
evidence suggesting a close link between the liberalisation of the financial 
system and economic and financial crises particularly in developing countries. 
Developed countries, including the US, the UK and Scandinavian countries, 
have also been subject to such crises, but compared with developing countries, 
the incidence has been relatively low and the social costs correspondingly 
smaller. However, developing countries have suffered not only more but also 
deeper crises and virtual financial meltdowns. 
 
To illustrate, Kaminsky and Reinhart's (1999) recent paper explored the links 
between banking crises, exchange rate crises and financial liberalisation. The 
sample consisted of twenty countries, of which fourteen were developing ones 
and it covered the period 1970-1995. The authors found that there was a sharp 
increase in both types of crises since 1980. The average number per year of 
banking crises in their sample rose from 0.3 during 1970-1979 to 1.4 in 1980-
1995. The two authors found that the banking crises and the currency crises are 
closely related and that the banking crises are often preceded by financial 
liberalisation. 
 
In their influential study Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) examined 
banking crises during the period 1980-1984 for a sample of 53 developed and 
developing countries. They found that banking crisis is more likely to occur 
where the financial system has been liberalised. They also found a two-way 
interaction between banking and currency crisis. Where the banking systems are 
not sufficiently developed, with capital account liberalisation, banks become 
vulnerable to external economic shocks. The authors' findings suggest that 
vulnerability is reduced with institutional development and strengthening of the 
banking system through prudential regulation. They also found that financial 
liberalisation leads to an intensification of competition among banks and hence 
to greater moral hazard and risk-taking than before. 
 
The recent Asian crisis provides almost a laboratory experiment for examining 
the role of capital account liberalisation in causing or exacerbating that region's 
severe economic downturn. Williamson (1998) provides evidence to suggest  
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that countries which did or did not have economic crisis were differentiated 
only by whether or not they had liberalised their capital accounts. Most 
economists would now agree that even if premature financial liberalisation 
without adequate prudential regulation was not the root cause of the crises in 
countries such as Thailand, Korea and Indonesia, it greatly contributed to the 
occurrence of the crisis and to its depth. Indeed, the economic fundamentals 
prior to the crisis of the affected countries were better than those of India, but 
the latter country was spared the crisis because of its control over the capital 
account. Similarly, China managed to avoid the crisis and continued to have fast 
economic growth. China also had not liberalised its capital account.
5 
 
It is argued by some that even with the acute economic crisis of 1998-1999, 
over the long run Korea with its economic openness was a much more 
successful economy than India. This argument has some plausibility but it 
overlooks the crucial fact that Korea's outstanding industrialisation record over 
the previous three decades was not accomplished by a liberalised financial 
system but rather by a highly controlled one. However, when the system was 
liberalised in the 1990s it was followed by an unprecedented crisis (see, also, 
Demetriades and Luintel, 2001). 
 
III.2 Social  and  Economic Costs of the Crisis 
 
The Asian crisis is extremely important in terms of its economic and social 
impact on the populations of the affected countries. The World Bank (2001) 
notes that 'In terms of lost output and the implications for poverty and 
unemployment, the Asian crisis represents one of the most acute periods of 
financial instability in this century' (page 73). The crisis greatly increased 
poverty, reduced employment and real wages and caused enormous social 
distress. Indeed the economic downturn was so enormous that in a country like 
Indonesia it led to a virtual disintegration of the social fabric of the country. 
This is why the Asian crisis is aptly termed, not just an ordinary slowing of 
GDP growth due to an economic shock, or a normal cyclical recession but an 
enormous meltdown. It is important to appreciate, however, that even if there is 
no meltdown, economic slowdowns or recessions have bigger social costs in 
developing than developed countries because of the lack of publicly provided 
social security in the former group. There is evidence that in both country 
groups the effects of a downturn fall disproportionately on the poor and on 




Turning to an investigation of costs purely in economic terms, there are good 
analytical reasons to believe that economic crises would negatively affect both 
investment and long-term growth
6. In addition, recessions and meltdowns also 
have fiscal and redistributive implications which may affect the economy for a 
long period of time. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) estimates indicate that the 
costs of a banking crisis are typically quite large; their research indicated that 
these ranged from 3.2 per cent of GDP in the U.S. savings and loans crisis of 
1984-1991 to 55.3 per cent for the banking crisis in Argentina from 1980-1982 
(table 1).  
 




Country   (Date)      Cost (percentage of GDP) 
 
Argentina    (1980-82)    55.3 
Chile   (1981-3)     41.2 
Uruguay    (1981-4)     31.2 
Israel   (1977-83)    30.0 
Cote  d'Ivoire    (1988-91)    25.0 
Senegal     (1988-91)    17.0 
Spain   (1977-85)    16.8 
Bulgaria   (1990s)     14.0 
Mexico     (1995)     13.5 
Hungary    (1991-5)     10.0 
Finland     (1991-3)     8.0 
Sweden   (1991)     6.4 
Sri  Lanka  (1989-93)    5.0 
Malaysia    (1985-8)     4.7 
Norway     (1987-9)     4.0 
United States   (1984-91)      3.2 
 
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel 1996. Quoted in Chang, (2001) 
 
 
In a pioneering study Easterley et. al. (2000) have investigated economic 
instability for a large cross-section of developed and developing countries over 
the period 1960-1990. As table 2 indicates, developing countries typically suffer 
greater instability than developed countries with respect to output, employment, 
real wages, capital flows and terms of trade changes. In neo-classical analysis it 
is customary to attribute instability to the lack of flexibility in labour markets,   
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Table 2. Economic instability and related variables: differences between developing and high-income OECD Countries 
 
   Developing countries                              High-income OECD countries 
    
            Number of         Number of    t-statistic for 
Variable    Mean    observation    Mean            observation  difference in means    P-
value  
                 
Growth      0.007    163      0.027                 23    -5.659                  0.000 
Standard deviation 
    of growth    0.061    163      0.026            23    9.779      0.000 
(Median standard    
    deviation of  
    growth)    0.052          0.022 
Standard deviation 
 of employment    0.098    83      0.035               21    6.652      0.000 
Standard deviation 
  of real wage index  2.119    90      1.883                   21    0.833      0.410 
Standard deviation 
  of real wage changes  1.197    85      0.321                 21    8.116      0.000 
Private capital   
flows / GDP    1.722    146      0.372                 22    2.743      0.009 
Standard deviation 
  of private capital 
  flows / GDP    2.662    138      2.311                  22    0.808      0.420 
Standard deviation 
   of terms of trade  
   changes    0.123    117      0.041                 23    9.688      0.000 
Standard deviation 
  of money growth  0.219    148      0.077                 20    6.757      0.000 
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particularly to wage rigidity. However, Easterley et al. find that despite greater 
labour market flexibility (measured by changes in real wages) in developing 
countries they exhibit greater volatility than developed countries (Table 2). The 
authors' results suggest that the characteristics of the financial system rather 
than the labour market are the more important causes of economic instability. 
Their econometric analysis shows that financial variables are statistically 
significant in explaining both volatility of GPD growth and the likelihood of a 
downturn. They find that openness and policy volatility also have a significant 
influence on growth volatility. In general, Easterly et al.'s findings suggest that 
countries with weak financial systems display greater instability in GPD growth 
in part because these institutional shortcomings amplify the effects of the 
volatility of capital flows. 
 
 
III.3  Capital Account Liberalisation and Proximate Causes of  Instability 
 
The fundamental theoretical reasons why capital account liberalisation may lead 
to economic instability were analysed in Section II. In view of  its huge 
economic and social costs, it would be useful to consider further empirical 
evidence on some of the proximate causes of the observed  relationship between 
free capital movements and economic instability. The more important of these 
include:  
 
1)  Volatility in capital flows 
2) Increased competition among banks following liberalisation as mentioned 
above; 
3) The changes in the global financial system and the short-termism of the 
leading players. 
 
The volatility and the pro-cyclicality of the private capital flows to developing 
countries is a well attested feature of international capital movements during the 
last two decades
7. Such in-flows come in surges, often bearing no relationship 
to the economic fundamentals of the country and leave the country when they 
are most needed, i.e. in a downturn. As Williamson and Drabek (1998) note, 
even in a country such as Chile which was deeply integrated with the world 
financial markets, private foreign capital suddenly withdrew in the event of a 
fall in copper prices. There is however an important debate on the comparative 
volatility of the different components of capital flows, which will be reviewed 
in the following sections. 
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As to the effects of the volatility of capital flows. Ramey and Ramey (1995) 
found that it was positively related to volatility of GDP growth, a result 
confirmed by Easterly et al. (2000). The former two authors also reported a 
negative relationship between long-run economic growth and the volatility of 
GDP growth, a result again confirmed by Easterly et al. (2000), and also by 
World Bank 2001, among others. Table 3, from the latter publication, presents 
regression results of the effects of capital flows and their volatility on growth 
per capita, for a large sample of developing countries over successive decades, 
covering the period 1970-1998. The table also contains the normal control 
variables used in such  cross-section analyses (e.g. initial GDP per capita, initial 
schooling, population growth rate, investment rates and a measure of policy). 
Volatility of capital flows is measured by the standard deviation of the flows. 
The dependant variable is the rate of growth of GDP per capita. The table 
suggests an economically important and statistically significant negative 
relationship between capital flow volatility and GDP growth per capita for the 
period as a whole 1970-1998. It is however interesting that the negative 
relationship becomes weaker over time, with the value of the relevant co-
efficient rising from a statistically significant minus .322 during 1970-79 to 
minus .124 in 1990-98 when the co-efficient was also statistically insignificant. 
Other results from table 3 will be commented on in the following section. 
 
 
Table 3. Effects of capital flows and their volatility on growth per capita, by decade 
 
    Dependent variable: rate of GDP growth per capital 
Independent variable  1970-98   1970-70   1980-89   1990-98 
   
Capital  flows   0.287**   -0.149   0.133   0.275** 
Capital flows volatility  -0.344** -0.322** -0.188   -0.124 
Initial GDP per capital  -0.508**  -0.345    -0.940**  0.159 
Initial  schooling   1.429   -1.749   3.640*   -0.446 
Population growth rate  -0.513**  -0.438    -0.573**  0.869** 
Investment    0.182**   0.309**   0.164**   0.094** 
Policy    0.008**   0.007**   0.011**   0.013** 
Inflation rate    -0.002**  -0.008    -0.001**  -0.004** 
Openness  of  the    0.001   0.006   0.001   -0.024** 
     economy 
 
Adjusted R
2   0.75   0.59   0.57   0.38 
No.  of  Countries.    72   56   74   100 
 
* denotes significance at the 10 per cent level, and ** at the 5 per cent level. 
Source: World Bank (2001) 
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The next issue is why are the capital flows to developing countries so volatile? 
Analysis and evidence suggests that both internal (e.g. weak domestic financial 
systems; frequent economic shocks) and external factors, particularly the animal 
spirits of foreign investors, are involved in making these flows volatile. 
 
Kindleberger (1984) has observed that financial markets are subject to frequent 
crises, which he ascribes to periodic and alternating bouts of irrational 
exuberance and pessimism of investors largely unrelated to fundamentals.   
Importantly, Kindleberger’s historical analysis is implicitly endorsed by Alan 
Greenspan, the Chairman of the US Federal Reserve himself, who recently 
commented as follows on the 1987 US stock market crash and the Asian 
financial meltdown of the 1990s:  
 
“At one point the economic system appears stable, the next it behaves as though 
a dam has reached a breaking point, and water (read, confidence) evacuates its 
reservoir. The United States experienced such a sudden change with the decline 
in stock prices of more than 20 per cent on October 19, 1987. There is no 
credible scenario that can readily explain so abrupt a change in the 
fundamentals of long-term valuation on that one day.  ... But why do these 
events seem to erupt without some readily evident precursors? Certainly, the 
more extended the risk-taking, or more generally, the lower the discount factors 
applied to future outcomes, the more vulnerable are markets to a shock that 
abruptly triggers a revision in expectations and sets off a vicious cycle of 
contraction. ... Episodes of vicious cycles cannot easily be forecast, as our 
recent experience with Asia has demonstrated.” (Greenspan, 1998)  
 
This mirrors the Keynesian view of investor behaviour and the significance of 
mass psychology in price formation in the financial markets, as discussed 
earlier. Keynes’s insights on this subject have been formalised in current 
theoretical literature, which is able to provide a 'rational' explanation for the 
herd-like behaviour, contagion and other irrational manifestations of economic 
agents in financial markets.
8 
 
It is also important to emphasise another major factor in causing the volatility of 
external capital flows to developing countries. Kauffman (2000) and 
Williamson (2002) have stressed the significance of changes in the nature and 
character of the financial markets in enhancing capital flow volatility. The 
intense competition in the world fund management industry together with the 
nature of rewards offered to fund managers have helped to make the latter short-
termist in their investment decisions
9.  As Kauffman (2000, p. 61) notes:  
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(In the new global financial system)  most prominent banks, securities firms, 
and even a few insurance companies possess departments that emulate the 
trading and investment approach of the hedge funds. Even the corporate 
treasuries of a number of non-financial corporations are engaged in this activity. 
Once arcane and exotic, the hedge fund approach to investment has been 
mainstreamed  
 
Finally, analysis and evidence for increased competition among banks following 




4. Evidence on Capital Account Liberalisation and Long Term Economic 
Growth  
 
In principal it is possible for the instability caused by capital account 
liberalisation to be more than compensated for by faster long term economic 
growth arising from the greater availability of capital inflows. This is the 
promise held by the proponents of this policy regime (see for example Fisher 
(1997) and Summers (2000) referred to earlier). It will therefore be useful to 
review the available empirical evidence on this issue. 
 
A good starting point is the broad brush approach adopted by Singh (1997a) in 
analysing this issue. He considers the case of advanced countries whose 
experience, he suggests, is relevant for developing economies. This is because 
the former have operated under a regime of relatively free trade and capital 
movements for nearly two decades - a period long enough to make at least a 
preliminary assessment of the effects of this economic regime on performance.  
Evidence suggests that the record has been less than impressive despite the fact 
that the world economy during this period has not been subject to any abnormal 
negative shocks like the oil price increases of 1973 and 1979.  Indeed, the 
economic performance of industrial countries during this later period has been 
much worse than in the earlier period of the 1950s and 1960s when they 
functioned under a myriad of capital controls. 
 
 GDP growth in the 1980s and 1990s under a liberal regime regarding private 
capital flows was much lower than that achieved in the “illiberal” and regulated 
“golden age” of the 1950s and 1960s; 
 Productivity growth in the last fifteen years has been half of what it was in 
the “golden age”;   
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 The critical failure is, however, with respect to employment:  8 million 
people were unemployed in the OECD countries in 1970, but by the mid 1990s  
35 million were unemployed, that is, 10 per cent of the labour force. 
 
Singh's analysis also shows that the poor performance of industrial countries 
during the 1980s and 1990s cannot alternatively be ascribed to exogenous 
factors such as the exhaustion of technological opportunities, or to labour 
market imperfections. Industrial economies have more flexible markets today 
than they did in the golden age. In addition they have the benefit of a new 
technological paradigm of information and communication technology which 
many economic historians regard as on a par with the most important 
technological revolutions of the last two centuries. In view of all these factors - 
a new technological paradigm, more flexible markets, absence of economic 
shocks such as the oil shocks of 1973 and 1975 - orthodox analyses would 
suggest that OECD economies should be growing today at a much faster rate 
than in the golden age. But as we see the opposite has been true. 
 
Eatwell's (1996) and Singh's (1997a) analysis indicates that the poor 
performance of industrial countries in the recent period is closely linked to 
intrinsic features of the liberal financial regime.  Co-ordination failures have led 
to sub-optimal levels of the OECD and world aggregate demand, output and 
employment. When capital flows were regulated in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
there was successful co-ordination under the hegemony of the United States, 
payments balance between countries was achieved at much higher levels of 
output and employment than has subsequently been the case under financial 
liberalisation. 
 
In contrast with the above broad brush approach, Rodrik (1998) has carried out 
an econometric analysis of the effects of capital account liberalisation on 
economic growth for developing countries.  Controlling for the other relevant 
variables (such as those given in table 3) for a sample of 100 developing 
countries over the period 1975-89, he finds no relationship between the capital 
account regime in developing countries and the following three indicators of 
economic performance: (a) per capita GDP growth, (b) share of investment in 
GDP and (c) inflation. 
 
On the face of it however the relevant regression results in Table 3 do not 
support the Rodrik conclusions. These results suggest that the volume of capital 
flows have on the whole a positive impact on GPD growth. This finding is 
nevertheless not necessarily in conflict with Rodrik's results because in Table 3 
the effect of volatility of capital movements has been separately controlled for.   
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However, if both the volume and the volatility of capital flows were considered 
together, the results might be much the same as those of Rodrik. 
 
Studies which disaggregate developing countries into different groups are able 
to find a more positive relationship between capital - flows and GDP growth. 
Thus Edwards (2000) suggests that there is no relationship between capital 
account liberalisation and economic growth in low income countries but the 
relationship becomes positive as the level of income rises. Similarly 
Eichengreen's (2000) review of a number of empirical studies suggests that the 
higher the level of income the greater the effect of capital inflows on GDP. 
 
To summarise, the above review of empirical evidence on capital account 
liberalisation, capital inflows and the growth of GDP and its volatility indicates 
that there is a close relationship between liberalisation and economic and 
financial crises. This relationship is robust and in the circumstances of 
developing countries there are also strong analytical arguments for both its 
existence and robustness. On the other hand available evidence does not 
indicate that free capital flows necessarily lead to faster long-term economic 
growth for the typical developing country. In view of these facts, Stiglitz (2000) 
is fully justified in castigating the IMF for its promotion of capital account 
liberalisation. Not only is there no adequate theoretical or empirical case for 
such espousal but there is in fact a strong case against it. Indeed the economic 
crises and the instability which capital account liberalisation is seen to generate, 
may compromise a country's future economic development by inducing capital 
flight and lowering domestic investment and long-term economic growth. 
 
 
5. Capital Account Liberalisation and FDI 
10 
 
As explained in the Introduction that while finding a 'compelling' case against 
any general liberalisation of the capital account, Stiglitz (2000) also suggest that 
there is a 'compelling' case in favour of FDI. In view of the fickleness of the 
short term capital flows and the gyrations of the markets, he comprehensively 
rejects the argument that capital account liberalisation is desirable because it 
imposes discipline on countries forcing them to follow good economic policy. 
However, he states that  " far more relevant for the long run success of the 
economy is the foreign direct investment and the desire to acquire and sustain 
FDI provide strong discipline on the economy and the political process " 
(p1080). Although, he does not specifically address this issue, Stiglitz comes 
close to accepting here the principles of a new proposal which is being put 
forward at the WTO by EU and Japan for a multilateral agreement on  
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investment (hereafter PMAI), covering only FDI. The background to this 
proposal is as follows. It will be recalled that three years ago the OECD 
countries failed to negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
amongst themselves, which was intended to be later acceded to by developing 
countries. PMAI is similar to MAI with a critical difference that unlike the latter 
the former will only be confined to FDI. This clearly represents a significant 
concession to developing countries.  The advanced countries' preference would 
seem to be to establish a binding treaty at the WTO which would create for FDI 
a regime similar to that of (free) trade in goods. 
 
In favouring FDI Stiglitz seems to be a part of a general consensus among 
economists which suggests that compared with debt and portfolio investment, 
FDI, apart from its other merits, is the safest source of funds for developing 
countries. It is thought to neither add to a country's debt, nor (being bricks and 
mortar) can it be quickly withdrawn from the country. Further, in view of the 
other virtues of FDI in bringing new technology, organisational methods etc, 
and importantly spill overs to domestic industry, the proponents claim that the 
case for PMAI becomes overwhelming.  
 
Those propositions will be contested below and it will be argued that unfettered 
FDI is not in the best interests of developing countries.   As in the case of short-
term flows, FDI also requires appropriate regulation by these countries to 
enhance social welfare. As such measures would be denied to them by PMAI it 
is suggested here that poor countries should resist the proposed agreement. 
 
It will be useful to begin this analysis by noting that there has also been a sea-
change in developing countries' perspective on, and attitude towards, FDI.  In 
the 1950s and 1960s, developing countries were often hostile towards 
multinational investment and sought to control multinational companies' 
activities through domestic and international regulations.  However, during the 
last two decades emerging countries have been falling over themselves to attract 
as much multinational investment as they can.  
 
This enormous shift in developing countries stance toward multinational 
investment is associated with the major changes which have occurred in the 
pattern of international capital flows to developing counties.  The former may 
be regarded as both a cause and the consequence of the latter. The most 
important change in capital flows for the purpose of this paper is the emergence 
of FDI as a predominant source of external finance for developing countries 
during the 1990s. Between 1996 and 1998 FDI inflows to developing countries 
constituted about 10 per cent of their gross capital formation. (Singh, 2001;  
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UNCTAD, 2001). It is also important to note that alongside these changes in the 
pattern of external finance, analysis and evidence suggest that developing 
countries' need for external finance has greatly increased. This is in part due to 
the liberalisation of trade and capital flows in the international economy. 
UNCTAD (2000) suggests that because of these structural factors, developing 
countries have become more balance of payments constrained than before: the 
constraint begins to bite at a much slower growth rate than was the case 
previously in the 1970's and 1980's. In these circumstances it is not surprising 
that developing countries have radically changed their attitude towards FDI. 
There has also, therefore, been intense competition among these counties for 
attracting FDI.  
 
This competition has resulted in a shift in the balance of power towards 
multinationals in their dealings with developing countries.  An important 
objection to PMAI is that if it were approved it would, instead of redressing this 
imbalance, make it worse than before. This is because the Agreement would 
essentially give the multinationals a license to (or not to) invest wherever or 
whenever they like regardless of the circumstance and needs of developing 
countries. 
 
It is important to observe that from the perspective of developing countries the 
present pattern of external resource flows including FDI flows is very 
unsatisfactory. A significant characteristic of FDI flows is that these are heavily 
concentrated in a few countries. These are normally countries, particularly those 
in East Asia, which already have very high savings and investment rates. On the 
other hand, low income and the Least Developed countries which have small 
saving rates because of their meagre levels of GDP per capita, do not get FDI or 
other external resources they need. Indeed, in broader terms, contrary to text 
book neo-classical economics, world resources do not go from the rich to the 
poor countries but instead are predominantly allocated to the rich countries 
including the richest among them, i.e., the US.
11 PMAI would do nothing to 
change this unsatisfactory pattern of resource flows; instead it is likely to 
accentuate these negative features.  
 
6. FDI and Financial Fragility 
 
Leaving aside other characteristics of FDI (to be discussed later), we will 
consider it first simply as a source of finance, and examine its implications for 
balance of payments and for macroeconomic management of the economy.  In 
contrast to portfolio investments, FDI by definition is supposed to reflect a long 
term commitment as it involves normally a stake of 10% or more in a host  
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country enterprise together with managerial control.
12  I n  v i e w  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  
element, the presumption is that the inflow of foreign capital in this form will be 
more stable than portfolio investments. The latter are easier to liquidate and 
following an internal or external shock, investors may quickly withdraw such 
funds from the host country.  
 
There are, however, important arguments to suggest that the presumption of 
stability in net FDI inflows may not be correct. First, the distinction between 
FDI and portfolio investment has become very much weaker with the growth of 
derivatives and hedge funds. As Claessens et al., (1995) observe, even at an 
elementary level it is easy to see how a long-term "bricks and mortar" 
investment can be converted into a readily liquid asset.  They note that a direct 
investor can use his/her immovable assets to borrow in order to export capital 
and thereby generate rapid capital outflows. 
 
Another reason why FDI may be volatile is because a large part of a country's 
measured FDI according to the IMF balance of payments conventions usually 
consists of retained profits. As profits are affected by the business cycle, they 
display considerable volatility. This also prevents FDI from being anti- cyclical 
and stabilising unless the host and home county economic cycles are out of 
phase with each other. That may or may not happen. 
 
Further, there is evidence that like other sources of finance FDI flows can also 
at times come in surges. Apart from their contribution to volatility, these FDI 
surges, as those for example of portfolio investment can lead to equally 
undesirable consequences such as exchange rate appreciation and reduced 
competitiveness of a country's tradable sector. 
 
Claessens et al. (1995) concluded that there were no statistically significant 
differences in the time series properties of the different forms of capital flows 
including FDI and that long-term flows were often as volatile as short- term 
flows. Williamson (2002) has suggested that this study may have failed to find 
differences between flows because it measured volatility in terms of the second 
moments of the time series instead of the ones of a higher order. The latter are 
relevant with respect to occasional 'meltdowns' which occurred for example in 
the Asian crisis.  UNCTAD's 1998 study of the stability of capital flows 
between 1992 and 1997 found that FDI was relatively more stable than portfolio 
flows, but there were important exceptions.  The latter included Brazil, South 
Korea and Taiwan. Lipsey (2001) also concluded that the FDI flows were 
relatively more stable overall. 
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It has been argued in favour of the FDI-stability thesis that during the Asian 
crisis and its aftermath, while bank lending and portfolio flows were sharply 
reversed, FDI continued much as before. However the motivation for this could 
have been what Krugman called the 'fire-sale' of devalued assets as a result of 
the crisis. Evidence, however, seems to suggest that it is more likely that the 
relative stability of FDI is due in part to the fact that the governments abolished 
regulations preventing or limiting FDI in domestic enterprises (albeit under IMF 
conditionality in the affected countries). Multinationals have used this 
opportunity to increase their holdings in local firms at cheap prices (World 
Bank (2001)). 
 
Even if FDI is somewhat less volatile than other flows there are other important 
implications of FDI for a host country's balance of payments which need to be 
considered. These derive from the fact that an FDI investment creates foreign 
exchange liabilities not only now but also into the future. This characteristic 
leads to the danger that unfettered FDI may create a time profile of foreign 
exchange outflows (in the form of dividend payments or profits repatriation) 
and inflows (e.g., fresh FDI) which may be time inconsistent.  Experience 
shows that such incompatibility, even in the short run may easily produce a 
liquidity crisis. The evidence from the Asian crisis countries with the latter 
suggests that it could in turn degenerate into a solvency crisis with serious 
adverse consequences for economic development. [See further Kregel (1996) 
and Singh (2001) on these points].  
 
These considerations suggest that in order to avoid financial fragility the 
government would need to monitor and regulate the amount and timing of FDI. 
Since the nature of large FDI projects (whether or not for example these would 
produce exportable products or how large their imports would be) can also 
significantly affect the time profile of aggregate foreign exchange inflows and 
outflows, both in the short and long-term, the government may also need to 
regulate such investments.  To the extent that the PMAI would not permit this 
kind of regulation of FDI, it would subject developing economies to much 
greater financial fragility than would otherwise be the case. 
 
It could in principle, be argued that even if the financial fragility point is 
conceded, a PMAI may still benefit developing countries by generating greater 
overall FDI which could compensate for the increased financial fragility. 
However, this proposition is of doubtful validity. We saw earlier, that there has 
been a huge increase in FDI in the 1990s. This occurred without any MAI and 
was clearly a product of a number of other factors.
13 Similarly, there does not 
seems to be any connection between regulatory constraints on FDI and the total  
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amount of FDI which a country may be able to attract. Malaysia (see further 
US, 1996) and China, (see Braunstein and Epstein, 1999), to illustrate, are large 
recipients of FDI despite having significant control and regulation over FDI 
projects. 
 
7. FDI and Real Economy, Technology Transfer, Spill-overs, Investment 
and  Savings 
 
Apart from FDI as a source of finance two of the most important ways in which 
a developing country may benefit from such investments is through (a) transfer 
of technology and (b) from spill-overs.  The latter refer to the effects of FDI on 
raising productivity in local firms. These firms may be helped by foreign 
investment in a variety of ways, including the demonstration effect of the new 
technology and the enhancement of the quality of inputs which such investment 
may promote.  On the other hand there may be few positive or even negative 
spill-overs, if FDI leads to local firms being forced out of the market because of 
greater competition.  
 
Both issues of technology transfer and spill-overs have been widely studied and 
there exists on these subjects a large and controversial literature. The main 
lesson which however comes from these writings in relation to the question of 
technology transfer is that a country is more likely to benefit from multinational 
investment if the latter is integrated into its national development and 
technological plans (see further Dunning (1994), Freeman (1989), Milberg 
(1999), South Centre (2000).  This is the reason why, other than Hong Kong, 
most successful Asian countries (including China and Malaysia as seen above) 
have not allowed unfettered FDI but have extensively regulated it.  On the issue 
of spill-overs, early studies were quite optimistic about the positive externalities 
from FDI on domestic industries.  However, these studies suffered from severe 
methodological difficulties particularly in relation to the question of causation.  
More recent research which uses more up-to-date methodology as well as large 
micro-economic data sets arrives at much more pessimistic conclusions.  Thus, 
in an influential study, Aitken and Harrison (1999) found that in Venezuela 
multi-national investment had a negative effect on productivity of domestic 
plants in the industry.  Such results are quite common from micro-level data 
(Hanson (2001).  In policy terms they reinforce the caution against unfettered 
FDI flows. 
    
A critical issue  in evaluating the effects of FDI on the real economy is its 
impact on domestic savings and investments. Economic theory does not yield 
any unambiguous predictions about how domestic investment may be affected  
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by foreign capital inflows. In general, this would depend upon the level of 
development of the economy, its degree of integration with international 
economy and its absorptive capacity. Table 4 shows the results of World Bank's 
analysis of the impact of various types of capital flows on investments and 
savings for a large cross-section of developing countries for the period 1972- 
1998. The results show that although FDI is positively associated with the 
investment, there is little relationship with savings. The long term bank lending 
has a more important influence on investment than does FDI. Portfolio 
investment is, on the other hand, associated more with savings than with 
investments. 
 
A more interesting analysis of this issue is reported in the recent study by 
Agosin and Meyer (2000). This study is able to examine the regional variations 
in the effects of FDI on the 'crowding' in and out of domestic investment.  The 
two authors' research covered the period 1970-1996 and included host countries 
from all three developing regions, Africa, Asia and Latin America.  The results 
of the econometric exercise suggest that over this long period there was a strong 
"crowding in" in Asia, "crowding out" in Latin America and more or less 
neutral effects in Africa.  Agosin and Mayer conclude: 
 
"The main conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the positive 
impacts of FDI on domestic investment are not assured.  In some cases, total 
investment may increase much less than FDI, or may even fail to rise when a 
country experiences an increase in FDI.  Therefore, the assumption that 
underpins policy toward FDI in most developing countries - that FDI is always 
good for a country's development and that a liberal policy toward MNEs is 
sufficient to ensure positive effects - fails to be upheld by the data." (p.14) 
 
They go on to note: 
 
"…the most far-reaching liberalisations of FDI regimes in the 1990s took place 
in Latin America, and that FDI regimes in Asia have remained the least liberal 
in the developing world… Nonetheless, it is in these countries that there is 
strongest evidence of CI (crowding in).  In Latin America, on the other 
hand,…liberalisation does not appear to have led to CI." (p.14) 
 
The policy implications of this analysis of FDI in relation to technology and 
spill-overs reinforce the message of the last section: developing countries need 
to regulate FDI closely in order for it to promote economic development and not 
































capital     
flows 
               0.72**  0.03
Long-term 
capital  
                 0.88** 0.10
Bank lending          1.45**  -0.17             
FDI                 0.84** -0.03
Portfolio 
investment 
                 0.50 0.84*
Short-term 
debt  
                0.23** 0.05
All other 
flows  
                        0.22 -0.16 0.53** -0.03 0.58** -0.23 0.52** -0.27 0.62 0.06
Growth rate, 
lagged 
0.33**                        0.33** 0.31** 0.36** 0.33** 0.46** 0.36** 0.45** 0.49** 0.48** 0.32** 0.39**
Change in 
terms of trade 
0.01                        0.04** 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.05** 0.02** 0.05** -0.00 0.04** 0.01** 0.05**
Inflation, 
lagged  
-0.00      -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** 0.00            -
0.00** 
-0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00
Adjusted R
2                          0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73
*denotes significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level. 
 
Table 4. Marginal impact of various types of capital flows on investment and saving 
 
Note. Fixed-effects regressions of investment (or saving) ratios against capital flows based on an unbalanced sample, consisting of a 
maximum of 118 countries, spanning the period 1972-98. The method of estimation was two-stage least squares, when a good instrument 
could be found; otherwise simple ordinary least squares results are reported. 
Source: World Bank, (2001). 
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In broad analytical terms, the case for such government interventions in the 
FDI process lies essentially in various kinds of market failures. Co-ordination 
problems abound in relation to investment, including foreign investment, and 
in the presence of non-existent or incomplete markets typical in a developing 
economy, governments need to intervene to address co-ordination failures.  It 
may be argued that these markets failures may turn out to be less important 
than government failures. That is certainly true in some cases, but it must be 
remembered that the developing world also contains a large number of highly 
successful governments, the so-called 'developmental states' in the newly 
industrialising countries (NICs). If developing countries are to attract the right 
kind of FDI in the right amounts, and to be able to obtain the maximum 
benefit from these, they need to guide the process and therefore must have 
effective states and appropriate institutional mechanisms. On the basis of case 
studies of several late industrialising economies, Amsden (2001) suggests that 
only those countries have been successful in the industrialisation process 
which were able to develop institutional mechanisms for ensuring 




The first part of the paper examined the theoretical and empirical case for full 
capital account liberalisation in developing countries and found it wanting.  
Indeed, as Stiglitz suggests, there is a compelling case against it.  The second 
part considered the question of long-term capital account liberalisation only, 
that of FDI.  Most economists, including Stiglitz, favour such capital flows 
into developing countries.  On closer analysis, however, it is shown here than 
even FDI, if unregulated, may do more harm than good to these countries.  It 
is therefore suggested that developing countries should resist the new 
multilateral agreement on investment which Japan and the EU are proposing, 










1 For a comprehensive and recent contribution see for example Feldstein (2002) 
2 This section of the paper draws on Chakravarty and Singh (1988) 
3 See further Freeman (1989); Chang  (1995); Singh (1995). 
4 On this set of issues, see for example, Stiglitz (1994); Allen and Gale (2000); 
Glen, Lee and Singh (2000) 
5 For fuller discussion of these issues see Singh (2002a); Jomo (2001); Singh 
and Weisse (1999) and Rodrik (2000). 
6 See further Pindyck (1991); World Bank (2001); Easterly et al (2000) 
7 See further Williamson (2002); Occampo (2001); Singh and Zammit (2000); 
Stiglitz (2000) 
8 See further, Shiller (2000); Singh and Weisse (1999); Singh (1999). 
9 For a fuller discussion of the issues involved in this argument see Cosh, 
Hughes and Singh (1990) and Singh (2000). 
10 This and the following sections are based on Singh (2001). 
11 See further Lucas (1990) and Sakakibara (2000). 
12 This is the empirical definition of FDI adopted by many countries to 
distinguish it from portfolio flows. 
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